时间：2025年12月25日（周四）14:30
地点：浙大管院A423会议室
主题：Do Engagement Auditors with Valuation Expertise Improve Acquirers’ M&A Outcomes?
主讲人：齐保垒教授, 西安交通大学会计与财务系系主任
主持人：董望教授，浙江大学管理学院
主讲人介绍：
齐保垒，西安交通大学管理学院会计与财务系教师、博士生导师、系主任，入选国家级青年人才、财政部全国会计领军人才、陕西省青年杰出人才、西安交通大学青年拔尖人才，陕西省工商管理类教学指导委员会秘书长，中国会计学会对外学术交流委员会理事，中国总会计师协会财务管理专业委员会委员。国际知名学术期刊Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics、《会计学季刊》副主编，《中国会计评论》《管理会计研究》《International Journal of Auditing》编委。在Journal of Accounting and Economics（UTD24）、The Accounting Review（UTD24）、Contemporary Accounting Research（FT50）、Journal of Business Ethics（FT50）、《管理世界》《会计研究》《管理工程学报》《南开管理评论》《管理评论》《管理科学》等国内外著名学术期刊发表论文90余篇。研究成果分别获得2017年、2020年教育部高等学校优秀科研成果（人文社科类）二等奖和三等奖，多次获得陕西省科学技术二等奖和三等奖。获得2023年度陕西省高等学校科学技术研究优秀成果特等奖。主持国家自然基金项目多项，其中青年基金项目的结项成绩为“特优”。
摘要：
Prior literature finds outside M&A advisors, such as investment bankers, usually do not improve their clients’ acquisition performance and are often associated with adverse M&A outcomes. We expect engagement auditors with valuation expertise to have both the incentives and expertise to help their clients avoid overvaluing target companies, a major cause of poor M&A performance. We test our prediction using Chinese data, where some engagement auditors are licensed Certified Public Valuers, with expertise in valuation. Consistent with our prediction, we find that clients with valuation-expert auditors receive higher M&A announcement-period returns. We identify two regulatory shocks that improve M&A returns for SOEs and small M&A deals, but only for companies with valuation-expert auditors. We also find corroborating evidence that clients with valuation-expert auditors pay lower takeover premiums, are less likely to report post-acquisition goodwill impairments, and exhibit higher post-acquisition financial performance. Further, the benefits from valuation-expert auditors are stronger when clients have less in-house valuation expertise and less M&A experience, when auditors have stronger industry expertise and audit financially more important clients, and when targets are more difficult to value. In contrast to prior literature, we identify an outside M&A expert that reliably improves their client’s M&A outcomes.
