题目：Limiting Too-Big-to-Fail & the Rise of Banking Fragility
新加坡国立大学商学院金融系助理教授，美国·纽约大学斯特恩商学院金融学博士。教研领域为金融市场与金融机构、系统性风险、金融稳定、家庭金融等领域。研究成果发表（包括已接收文章）：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences和Management Science
We show that heightened regulation on large banks contributed to the rise in banking fragility leading up to the regional bank crisis of 2023. Starting in 2018, U.S. regulators have restricted Wells Fargo from growing beyond $1.95 trillion in assets. Constrained by this asset cap, Wells Fargo contracted geographically, and its deposit growth stalled. Wells Fargo gave up large uninsured deposits to stay under the asset cap. We show that smaller, less regulated banks stepped in to fill the gap. Banks more geographically proximate to Wells Fargo experienced an influx of flighty uninsured deposits, particularly during the COVID-19 period. In turn, these banks experienced higher deposit outflows once monetary tightening commenced, and had lower equity returns following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank. We rule out alternate explanations by showing that deposit growth is higher at branches directly competing with Wells Fargo compared to other branches of the same bank in the same county.